Here, the first parameter is a device object, and the second parameter represents the IRP request to handle. NTSTATUS Handler(PDEVICE_OBJECT pDevice, PIRP pIRP) Now before we move on, we should know that each IRP handler function has the following prototype: You might wonder, do we have to set breakpoints on all of the 28 functions? The answer is YES and NO.
PASSMOZ LABWIN TORRENT DOWNLOAD DRIVER
(2) Each driver may have a collection of 28 functions to handle different types of I/O requests (such as close handle, read, write etc.) The IRP Function code can be found at (typical ones are IRP_MR_CREATE and IRP_MR_READ). Here pDrv is a pointer to _DRIVER_OBJECT, and reg is a string that represents the registry entry where the driver could store information.Īs we shown earlier in Tutorial 20, the DriverEntry function is located at _+372b. NTSTATUS DriverEntry(PDRIVER_OBJECT pDrv, PUNICODE_STRING reg) (1) Each driver has a driver entry function, its prototype is shown below: In the following, we summarize of the major points here. Opferman provides an excellent introduction and sample code in. (3) Set a breakpoint " bu _+2BDE" in WinDbg to intercept the driver entry function.ģ. (2) The second " Win_DEBUG" image has to be run in the DEBUG mode and there should be a WinDbg hooked from the host system using COM part - so here, we are doing kernel debugging. Jump to 0x10002BDE to start the analysis. See Section 2 of Tutorial 20 for details.
To do this, you have to modify the control flow of IMM so that it does not crash on. You don't really need to run the malware on this instance, but just to record all your observations using the. (1) You need a separate image named " Win_Notes" to record and comment the code. In the following we just remind you of several important steps in the configuration: In general we will use the instructions of Section 2 of Tutorial 20. In this tutorial, we perform analysis on the code of raspppoe.sys from _+2BDE ( 0x10002BDE) To replicate the experiments of this tutorial, you have to follow the instructions in Section 2 of Tutorial 20. +0x038 MajorFunction : 0xfae56bde long +0 Obtaining the module base address, we can easily calculate its offset: _+2BDE. Pay attention to the value of MajorFunction ( 0xfae36bde), this is where IO requests are handled. Recall that in section 4.2.3 we showed you Max++ creates a new IO device and hooks it to the malicious driver object, so that whenever an IO request is raised on this device the request will be forwarded to driver object 8112d550, as shown below. We reveal how Max++ uses a modified disk driver to handle I/O requests on the disk it created (its name is "\\?\C2CAD."). This tutorial continues the analysis presented in Tutorial 20. Reverse engineering Max++ driver infection technique.Understand virtual hidden drive creation.Understand basic inner working of disk driver.
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